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RECENT CASE NOTES
appellees cited the case of Gentile v. State.1 4 In that case it was held that
since all members of the legislature were required to take oath to support
the constitution of the state, it could not be presumed that the members would
disregard their obligations in this respect in deciding whether or not the
constitutional restriction on special laws was or was not applicable. The
court in the principal case properly repudiated the doctrine of Gentile v.
State, pointing out that the same reasoning would apply to all provisions of
the constitution limiting the power of the legislature, and that whenever the
legislature over-stepped one of these bounds, the fact that the members had
been bound by oath would not prevent such legislation being held unconsti-
tutional. S.S.
Contracts-Arbitration-Sherman Act-Plaintiff Distributing Corpora-
tion sued the Defendant Theater Company for damages for breach of
contract in which contract the defendant agreed to pay a fixed sum for the
privilege of exhibiting certain pictures in defendant theater. The alleged
breach of contract consisted of defendant's refusal to accept, play, or pay
for the motion picture productions for which it had contracted. Defendant
contended that the clause of the contract which required that the plaintiff
should have pursued a course of arbitration before resorting to court action
had not been complied with and also that the contract sued on was in restraint
of trade and a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Plaintiff obtained
judgment in the trial court. Held: on appeal, affirmed, the court declaring
that the clause requiring arbitration was void as in violation of the Sherman
Act. but that the contract was divisible and thus the remainder could be sued
upon.'
The first attack on the validity of the Standard Exhibition Contract in
the motion picture industry was made by the federal government in 1929.
As a result of such attack, the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation v. United States2 found that the
activities of the defendant producers and distributors, including the agree-
ment to adopt and to use the Standard Form Contract, with its compulsory
arbitration clause, constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade and thus in
violation of the Sherman Act.3 As a result of this decree, the question arose
as to what effect the decision must have on the thousands of contracts made
in the standard form by distributors and exhibitors throughout the country.
Before proceeding with the discussion, let it be said that the court's find-
ing that the arbitration clause is invalid, yet the contract is divisible and the
remaining portions are enforceable is not without respectable authority.4
But there is, also, equally as strong authority to the contrary.5
14 (1868) 29 Ind. 409.
1 Walker Theater Co. v. R. K. 0. Distributing Corporation (Ind. 1934), 189
N. E. 162.
2 (1930), 282 U. S. 30, 51 S. Ct. 45.
3 26 Stat. 209 (1891) ; 15 U. S. C. Nos. 1-7, 15 (1927).
4 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corporation v. Cocke (Texas 1933), 56 S. W.
(2d) 489; Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation v. National Theater Corporation
(C. C. A. 1931), 49 Fed. (2d) 64; Fox Film Corporation v. Buchanan (1931), 17 La.
App. 285, 136 So. 197; Fox Film Corporation v. Bailly (S. Dak. 1932), 246 N. W. 111;
Fox Film Corporation v. Ogden Theater Company (Utah 1932), 17 Pac. (2d) 294;
Columbia Pictures Corporation v. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. (1930), 42 Fed. (2d) 873.
5 United Artist Corporation v. Odeon Bldg. (Wis. 1933), 248 N. W. 784; Fox Film
Corporation v. C. & M. Amusement Co. (1932), 58 Fed. (2d) 337; United Artists
Corporation v. Piller (N. Dak. 1932), 244 N. W. 20; Universal Film Exchanges v.
West (Miss. 1932), 141 So. 293; Fox Film Corporation v. Tri-State Theaters (Idaho
1931), 6 Pac. (2d) 135; Vitagraph Inc. v. Theatre Realty Co. (1931), 50 Fed. (2d)
907; see Majestic Theater Co. v. United Artist Corporation (1930), 43 Fed. (2d) 991.
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Insomuch as all the cases are based on the Paramount decision, it is best to
make a careful analysis of it. Here, the action was brought by the United
States government against the distributors to prevent further violation
'of the Sherman Act through a combination and conspiracy to restrain
interstate commerce in motion picture films. The court enjoined them
from operating under the contract in restraint of trade, but did not say
nor undertake to say, that certain parts of the contract were invalid and
certain parts valid. 6 In the opinion appears the following passage, "It
may be that arbitration is well adapted to the needs of the motion picture
industry; but when under the guise of arbitration, parties enter into unusual
arrangements which unreasonably suppress normal competition, their action
becomes illegal." 7 This language does not mean that the parties could in no
case arbitrate, but that they might arbitrate as long as it was voluntary and
without coercion. The case merely enjoined the combination of the distribu-
tors in restraint of trade which was to be carried out through the Standard
Exhibition Contract. The enforceability of the contract against the exhibitor
was not involved, he was not a party to the contract and his rights under it
could not be' determined.
Arbitration agreements in contracts are almost as old as Anglo-American
law itself. At first, in England, such agreements met the disapproval of the
courts since the courts at that time were jealous of anything which would
deprive them of any control over the action.' But in England today, the
parties apparently may make all rights under a contract conditional an arbi-
tration by using language appropriate for the purpose.9 In many of the
United States a doctrine similar to that adopted by the English courts seem
to prevail. 10 However, in many states, a distinction is made between an
agreement to arbitrate the whole question of liability which is held ineffectual
even though expressed in the form of a condition precedent, and an agree-
ment which merely provides for the determination of a particular fact as for
the valuation of loss or injury." Of course, it has always been against the
theory of the common law to uphold agreements ousting the courts of their
jurisdiction, 12 but where the courts have control over the case as by a condi-
tion precedent or statutory arbitration the courts are not ousted of their
judisdiction and agreements which go no further than this are now held
to be legal.13
6 United Artist Corporation v. Piller (N. Dak. 1932), 244 N. W. 20.
7 Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation v. United States (1930), 282 U. S. 30, 43.
8 Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811; see also U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad
Lake Petroleum Co. (1915), 222 Fed. 1006.
9 Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. C. 811; Viney v. Bignold, 29 Q. B. D. 172; Manchester
Ship Canal Co. v. Pearson (1900), 2 Q. B. 606; Spurrier v. La Cloche (1902), A. C.
446; Woodall v. Pearl Assurance Co. (1919), 1 K. B. 593.
1o Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co. (1890), 137 U. S. 370, 11 S. Ct. 133; Birmingham Ins.
Co. v. Pulver (1888), 126 Ill. 329, 18 N. E. 804; Seward v. Rochester (1888), 109
N. Y. 164, 16 N. E. 348.
11Bauer v. Samson Lodge (1885), 102 Ind. 262, 1 N. E. 571; Supreme Council v.
Garrigus (1885), 104 Ind. 133, 3 N. E. 818; Louisville, etc. Ry. Co. v. Donnegan (1887),
111 Ind. 179, 12 N. E. 153; Supreme Council v. Forsinger (1890), 125 Ind. 52, 25
N. E. 129; McCoy v. Able (1891), 131 Ind. 417, 30 N. E. 528; Miles v. Schmidt (1897),
168 Mass. 339, 47 N. E. 115; Meyers v. Jenkins (1900), 63 Ohio State 224, 57 N. E.
1089; Wyckoff v. Woarms (1907), 118 N. Y. App. Div. 699, 103 N. Y. S. 650; Maitland
v. Reed (1906), 37 Ind. App. 469, 77 N. E. 290; Ditton v. Hart (1911), 175 Ind. 181,
93 N. E. 961.
12 Kistler v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. R. Co. (1882), 88 Ind. 460, 464; The Supreme
Council of the Order of Chosen Friends v. Forsinger (1890), 125 Ind. 52, 55; Meyers v.
Jenkins (1900), 63 Ohio State 224, 57 N. E. 1089.
13 H. E. Willis, Indiana Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts
(1933), sec. 550; Restatement to the Law of Contracts, sec. 550; E. M. S. Steers, Arbi-
tration at Common Law in Indiana (1929), 5 Ind. L. J. 175; Hardware Dealers Mutual
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As arbitration clauses generally have been upheld as legal, it is extremely
,difficult to comprehend how they are illegal in this instance, unless such
agreement is one of the provisions of a contract which is illegal because in
restraint of trade. In other words, how can the arbitration stipulati6n be
invalid while the contract is deemed valid? To defeat a contract as illegal
because of it being in restraint of trade, it must appear that the contract is
directly connected with the unlawful purpose and not merely collateral
thereto.' 4 And contracts lawful on their face are illegal if in furtherance of
a combination in itself illegal.1 5 In the instant case, it is obvious that the
whole contract was in furtherance of the illegal combination of distributors
and producers, it was the means to carry out the conspiracy. As far as the
defendant is concerned, the vice is the contract and not merely the stipula-
tion for arbitration since he was deprived of the freedom of contract which
the law contemplates. The distributor is suing on the identical contract
which was the evidence of the conspiracy and the object of the restraining
decree in the Paramount case. The enforcement of the very instrumentality
of the conspiracy itself, as done in this case, falls within the interdictum of
the Supreme Court that an action cannot be maintained on a contract which
is part of an uhlawful conspiracy.' 6
S. E. M.
Declaratory Judgment Act-What Constitutes a Controversy Within the
Scope of the Act-In 1912, the defendant entered into a contract with Stough-
ton A. Fletcher and Albert E. Metzger under the terms of which she leased
to them certain real estate in the city of Indianapolis for a term of ninety-
nine years. The lessees assigned their interest to the plaintiff, the Fletcher
Savings .and Trust Building Company who, in turn, sublet the real estate and
building, which it had erected thereon, to its coplaintiff, the Fletcher Savings
and Trust Company, for a period of fifteen years, or until January 1, 1934.
Under the covenants of this lease the lessees agreed to pay any taxes, assess-
ments, benefits or rates levied by virtue of a local, state or national authority
upon the real estate or buildings, or which might be assessed upon the right
of the lessor to receive the rentals thereunder during the lease. After the 1913
income tax law was enacted by Congress, a controversy developed between
the plaintiffs and defendant as to whether or not the duty rested on the plain-
tiffs, as lessees, to pay the income taxes charged against the rents received by
the defendant from the plaintiffs. For the purpose of obtaining a declaratory
judgment or decree respecting the duties and obligations of the respective
parties, the plaintiffs filed a complaint, alleging these facts, to which the
defendant demurred for want of a jurisdiction and insufficiency of facts to
state a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled, whereupon the de-
fendant filed an answer, to the second, third, and fourth paragraphs of which
the plaintiffs demurred for insufficiency of facts. These demurrers were sus-
tained. Upon the issues thus formed the cause was tried, resulting in a
judgment for the plaintiffs. Defendant then filed a motion to modify the
judgment, which was overruled, and a motion for a new trial, which was also
overruled. The defendant then appealed, contending, among other things,
that no actual controversy within the purview of the Declaratory judgment
Act was shown by the pleadings or proof. Held, where landlord and tenants
Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Glidden Co. (1931), 52 S. Ct. 69 (Held statutory arbitration due
process of law).
'4 Camors-McConnell Co. v. McConnell (1905), 140 Fed. 412; Hadley-Dean Plate
Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co. (1906), 143 Fed. 242; Northwestern Consol. Milling
Co. v. Callam (1910), 177 Fed. 786.
15 McNear Inc. v. Am. & British Mfg. Co. (1919), 42 R. I. 302, 107 Atl. 242.
Ie Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co. (1907), 212 U. S. 227.
